The Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Military Intelligence Agency (AIM) of the Ministry of Defence today published the joint report “Cobasna Ammunition Depot: Debunking the Myths”, which provides a technical and security assessment of the ammunition depot located in Cobasna, in the Transnistrian region, and which is de facto under the control of the Russian Federation....

The full report is available on the official websites of the two institutions. (HERE)...

The report in English is available HERE....

The Cobasna depot has often been portrayed by some representatives of the separatist regime on the left bank of the Dniester, certain officials of the Russian Federation, as well as some domestic voices, as a potential catastrophe of regional proportions. This report presents technical storage data, ammunition characteristics, engineering calculations and terrain features that debunk these false narratives and describe the actual consequences of a potential explosion....

According to the assessment, of the approximately 20,000 tonnes of ammunition reported in 2006, around 14,000 tonnes are currently estimated to remain at the Cobasna storage facilities. Of this amount, approximately 2,800 tonnes represent the net explosive mass, while the remainder consists of casings, packaging, metal components and other inert materials that cannot detonate....

The analysis highlights that the ammunition is dispersed across 42 separate storage facilities and that the characteristics of the storage infrastructure, protective measures and terrain configuration significantly reduce the likelihood of the entire stock detonating simultaneously. Should an incident occur, the consequences would likely take the form of successive explosions and localized fires, with effects concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the facility, rather than a single large-scale explosion. This scenario is supported by the dynamics of explosions historically recorded at ammunition depots of a similar size, including on the territory of the Russian Federation....

Map-based explosion simulations indicate that the resulting blast wave would have a limited impact on nearby settlements. The distance between the outermost storage facility and the administrative boundary of the nearest settlement to Cobasna, the village of Andreieni, is 2 km. Since any realistic incident would originate at an individual facility located further inside the complex rather than at its outer boundary — and since the topography and existing natural and artificial barriers would confine the impact largely to uninhabited terrain — the settlement lies outside the area of major damage. Such damage would be limited to a radius of up to 2 km from the epicentre, meaning within the depot grounds, which have a perimeter of approximately 5 km....

The report also refutes scenarios suggesting that an incident at Cobasna could produce an explosion comparable in force to the use of a nuclear weapon. According to the report’s conclusions, such scenarios arise from confusing the total mass of ammunition with the net quantity of explosive material and fail to take into account the technical characteristics of ammunition storage, which make the simultaneous detonation of the entire stock unlikely....

The narrative of a “disaster” is an exaggeration intended to influence the national decision-making process: the risk of a catastrophic explosion is being used to legitimize an illegal military presence, turning an ammunition depot into an instrument for undermining national stability and security....

The SIS and AIM emphasize that the Cobasna depot represents a genuine risk requiring continuous management and monitoring, but it should not be portrayed as a threat of regional proportions or as a catastrophic scenario....

The Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Military Intelligence Agency (AIM) of the Ministry of Defence invite journalists to a press conference dedicated to presenting the main findings and conclusions of the joint report “Cobasna: Separating Myth from Reality”....

During the event, Alexandru MUSTEAȚA, Director of the SIS, and Radu CIȘLEANU, Director of the AIM, will present the technical and security assessment of the Cobasna ammunition depot, including data on ammunition stocks, the specific characteristics of the storage infrastructure, identified risk scenarios and recommended measures for managing those risks. Clarifications will also be provided regarding certain scenarios circulated in the public domain concerning the scale and potential consequences of an incident at the Cobasna depot....

Media access will be granted on the basis of a valid press credential. Participation must be confirmed by 10:00 on Friday, 21 August 2026, by sending a message to press@sis.md....

The press conference will take place on:...

Friday, 21 August 2026...

11:00...

Headquarters of the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS), 166 Ștefan cel Mare și Sfânt Boulevard...

Entrance to the event will be from S. Lazo Street....

On 24 July 2026, the Centre Court of Appeal issued a judgment granting the application filed by the Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova and finding that the Autonomous Non-Commercial Organization for the Promotion of International Cooperation “Eurasia” (Автономная некоммерческая организация содействия международного сотрудничества „Евразия”) had engaged in extremist activity, declaring it an extremist organization....

Pursuant to the court judgment, the organization was entered in the Register of Extremist Organizations and Materials of an Extremist Nature, in accordance with the conditions established by the legislation in force....

The Security and Intelligence Service recalls that, once a legal entity is entered in the Register of Extremist Organizations and Materials of an Extremist Nature, managing or organizing its activities, participating in the organization’s activities, financing it, as well as producing, possessing for the purpose of distribution, distributing or promoting materials issued by that organization may incur criminal liability under Articles 346¹ and 346² of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova....

In this context, the Service recommends that all citizens of the Republic of Moldova, including those residing or staying abroad, refrain from any form of cooperation with or involvement in the activities of the “Eurasia” Organization, terminate any existing employment relationships or other forms of cooperation with it, refrain from participating in events organized by or involving the organization, and refrain from distributing or promoting materials produced or disseminated by it....

The Security and Intelligence Service will continue to monitor compliance with the legal framework and take the measures provided for by law to prevent and counter extremist activities, with a view to protecting the national security and constitutional order of the Republic of Moldova....

The Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova is in possession of validated data regarding the involvement of the Russian Federation authorities, in particular the special services and the Embassy of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Moldova, in backing Alexandr Nesterovschi to evade the national law enforcement.

Therefore, according to the SIS data, on March 18, 2025, at 8:15 PM, one day  before the sentence of conviction was pronounced, Alexandr Nesterovschi was observed entering the premises of the Russian Federation Embassy to Chisinau.

In the morning of March 19, 2025, Alexandr Nesterovschi was transported by a vehicle with diplomatic plates of the RF Embassy to the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova, where he has remained until now under the direct protection of the Russian special services. Therefore,  at the time the sentence was pronounced convicting Alexandr Nesterovschi to 12 years imprisonment in a closed-type penitentiary, he was already on the territory of the left bank.

Another element that confirms the involvement of the Russian Federation in providing protection to Nesterovschi is the fact that, although he had held Russian citizenship for some time, on the day his conviction was pronounced, the Russian government media outlets were actively promoting the news regarding his granting of Russian citizenship.

It should be noted, that Alexandr Nesterovschi is part of the criminal network coordinated by Ilan SHOR, who is also evading the execution of the prison sentence for a term of 15 years. He is on the territory of the Russian Federation and enjoys the protection of the authorities from Kremlin.

The Security and Intelligence Service submitted the information in possession to the decision makers.

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The Security and Intelligence Service comes with some clarifications regarding the inaccurate information shared via social platforms regarding the removal of legal entities from the List of persons for whom there is evidence or documented information indicating an association with the subject of restrictions, approved by the Order of the SIS Director no. 2/2024.

It should be noted that following the amendment of Law no. 25/2016 on the implementation of international restrictive measures (hereinafter - Law no. 25/2016), by means of Law no. 116/2024 on the amendment of certain legislative acts, the status of the legal person controlled by the subject of the restrictions has been regulated.

As a result of the above-mentioned amendments, some of the legal entities which were included in the List of persons associated with the subject of restrictions - Ilan ȘOR, were reclassified from associated legal entities to legal entities controlled by the subject of restrictions.

Thus, the legal entities concerned were included in the List of legal entities for which there is documented information indicating that they are under the control of the subject of restrictions - Ilan ȘOR, approved by the Order of the SIS Director no. 80/2024.

For clarification purposes, we emphasize that assigning the status of an entity controlled by the subject of the restrictions entails more drastic measures for the included legal entities, provided for in art. 29 of Law no. 25/2016, namely, the blocking of funds and economic resources of the legal entities.

Accordingly, the legal entities included in the List approved by Order no. 80/2024 have been excluded from Annex no. 6 of the Order of the SIS Director no. 2/2024 "On the approval of the List of persons for whom there is evidence or documented information indicating an association with the subject of restrictions".

The above-mentioned Orders will be published in “Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova” and will be communicated to the public authorities in order for the actions provided by Law 25/2016 to be carried out.

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Today, during the plenary session of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, the SIS Director, Alexandru Musteața presented the institutional report on the electoral frauds identified by the Security and Intelligence Service during the presidential elections and constitutional republican referendum held this year.

The report contains detailed and complex information on the forms of external interference in the electoral process in the Republic of Moldova, including illicit financing, propaganda campaigns, disinformation, etc.

According to data obtained by the Service, an operational command center was set up in Moscow (Russian Federation), under the coordination of the Russian authorities, with the primary objective of compromising the republican referendum and the presidential elections. For this purpose, the Russian factor appointed Ilan Shor as the leader of this criminal group, providing him with all the necessary tools: financial, media, human, logistical, technical resources, as well as counterintelligence support.

The SIS jointly with the national authorities and foreign partners reacted promptly to prevent and combat external interference and other prominent risks regarding the electoral process, carrying out multiple and diverse measures within their competence. As a result, the institutions identified and countered the activity of pseudo-observers involved in election monitoring, prevented and thwarted cyber attacks on electoral infrastructure, prevented subversive actions aimed to disturb the public order, recorded cases of vote buying and foiled plans that were intended to compromise the activities of polling stations abroad (the scenario of fake bomb alerts).

At the same time, the Service informed about the security risks posed by the clear trend of the Russian factor to use informational influence tools. They were actively employed by the Russian Federation for propaganda and disinformation. As an example, in 2024, the institution identified a network that systematically shared pro-Kremlin narratives (including pro-war) via Telegram, TikTok and YouTube.

The full and detailed report describing and demonstrating the whole spectrum of external interference in the electoral process that took place this year in the Republic of Moldova can be found here.

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In addition to the information presented at the press briefing held by Alexandru Musteața - Director of the Security and Intelligence Service, Viorel Cernăuțeanu - Head of the National Police, and Victor Furtună - interim Chief Prosecutor of the PCCOCS (Prosecutor’s Office for Countering Organized Crime and Special Cases) on the actions of law enforcement institutions taken to counteract destabilization intentions on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, the SIS provides some details.

The Security and Intelligence Service has carried out a series of intelligence and counter-intelligence operations to detect and prevent the materialization of risks to national security. In recent months, the SIS gathered information on the attempts to destabilize the constitutional order in the context of electoral processes in the Republic of Moldova. It was sent to the Prosecutor’s Office for Countering Organized Crime and Special Cases, as well as to the General Inspectorate of Police.

During the operations, it was established that Ilan ȘOR used the "EURASIA" NGO as a cover to fund the trips to Moscow for groups of young people in order to train them on tactics and methods of carrying out protest actions.

Some of these young people were trained by foreign instructors connected to entities associated with the private military structures "Wagner" and "Farm" established by PRIGOJIN Evghenii. At the same time, some individuals were selected for more advanced training in guerrilla camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. Most of the trainings took place from the beginning of September until mid-October.

The training program included:

- tactics of national division as well as destabilization of constitutional order;

- tactics of provoking law enforcement bodies;

- use of weapons and other objects to cause non-lethal physical harm;

- mass psychology;

- physical confrontation with law enforcement during protests;

- manufacture and use of fire-starting tools and homemade explosives;

- handling drones with special attachments for explosives or fire-starting tools.

The type of training provided to the citizens of the Republic of Moldova points to offensive actions during mass actions, aimed to cause disturbances and panic. They intended to organize protests and participate in violent, radical and extremist actions on the national territory, in the context of the Republican Constitutional Referendum and 2024 Presidential Elections.

According to data collected by the Security and Intelligence Service, the following foreign citizens are among the coordinators of the mentioned actions: GOLOSKOKOV Konstantin and POTEPKIN Mikhail, the latter is subject to international sanctions. It should be noted that POTEPKIN is known for his connections with PRIGOJIN Evghenii and the Russian organization "FERMA", which was involved in 2023 in financing and organizing destabilizing protest actions in the Republic of Moldova. At the moment, he is responsible for carrying out worldwide malign influence within the entity "AKSON".

Moreover, the SIS managed to identify 11 other foreign nationals who provided assistance to the training camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, acting as instructors:

1. LUCHNIKOV Aleksandr

2. MOSKVIN Serghei

3. SOLOVICH Sergey

4. BEKER Andrei

5. VOLKHONSKI Aleksandr

6. GRUNICHEV Aleksey

7. BUBNOV Gheorgii

8. VILDIAEV Vladimir

9. RUSSU Danila

10. NEKLYUDOV Dmitrii

11. ANGELOV Mircho

We emphasize that ANGELOV Mircho, in addition to being one of the instructors of the guerrilla camps for citizens of the Republic of Moldova, was also involved in carrying out acts of vandalism, such as sabotaging several ATMs in Chișinău, last spring, in order to cause panic in the society.

At the moment, 4 Moldovan citizens trained in guerrilla camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia have been detained by the PCCOCS and remanded in custody for 30 days.

The Security and Intelligence Service jointly with the national law enforcement authorities actively monitors risks and threats to ensure the security of citizens on the national territory. At the moment, the level of danger in the public space is low.

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The SIS management had a meeting with several archival and historical researchers, where they discussed various ways in which historical expertise can contribute to the improvement of current national security activities. The main topics on the agenda included: combating historical misinformation, preventing distortion of events from the country's past, and the importance of protecting national archives in the stability of our national identity.

A particularly important aspect of this collaboration is the process of declassifying some materials from the archives of the Security and Intelligence Service. The declassification of these historical documents will give the public access to essential information about our past, contributing to a better understanding of the events that have shaped the destiny of our nation. This will not only increase transparency but will also facilitate national reconciliation by elucidating controversial aspects of the recent history.

Among the materials to be declassified are several manuals of the Soviet secret services – KGB and NKVD. These historical documents reveal the techniques and methods of propaganda, disinformation and manipulation used in the past. However, forces hostile to the Republic of Moldova continue to use them nowadays to divide society, undermine democratic processes and keep our country in the sphere of external influence. Access to this information will enable the public to better understand the current dangers, to resist efficiently the manipulation attempts, and to support efforts to strengthen democracy, independence, territorial integrity and the resilience of our citizens.

"History is more than simply a remembrance of the past, it is the foundation of national identity and a key strategic resource for the country's security. Our collaboration with the community of historians allows us to identify and to efficiently counter threats to our values, our collective memory, but it is also an important step in providing society with access to the historical truth", said Alexandru Musteața, the SIS Director.

At the same time, the Security and Intelligence Service transferred another 34 203 records to the National Agency of Archives. These were part of the Fund of filter and trophy documentary materials and the Fund of documentary materials of persons subject to political repression during the totalitarian regime, which went through the rehabilitation procedure at the General Prosecutor's Office, and were later declassified by the SIS Departmental Commission.

The SIS aims to continue this declassification process in a responsible manner, ensuring that documents are handled with care and that the information is presented in an appropriate context. This joint effort will bring significant benefits to society, including raising public awareness, promoting a culture of remembrance and supporting academic research.

The Security and Intelligence Service remains committed to protecting national interests and promoting effective cooperation with all sectors of society, including the academic environment. The SIS expresses its gratitude to historians for their valuable contribution and encourages them to continue to play an active role in defending and promoting the national heritage as a living memory of the troubled past, which we no longer want for the Republic of Moldova.

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SIS officers, jointly with the PCCOCS prosecutors, announce the detention of two officials from the Parliament and the Border Police. They are suspected of treason and conspiracy against the Republic of Moldova in their communication with an employee of an embassy in Chișinău.

The actions took place starting in 2023. One of the officials is suspected of treason for allegedly collecting and delivering to the embassy employee information to be used to the detriment of the interests of the Republic of Moldova.

The second official is suspected of plotting against Moldova. He acted for personal gain. Hence, the official maintained contact with the embassy employee in order to gather and transmit information to be used against the interests of the Republic of Moldova.

Following the criminal proceedings, both officials were detained for 72 hours to allow for an objective continuation of the investigations. According to the law, during this period of time they benefit from the presumption of innocence.

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At the end of last week, authorities responsible for ensuring state security intervened on the basis of operational information to detain suspected members of terrorist organizations, following an INTERPOL alert.

Among them was a 20-year-old citizen of the Republic of Georgia, for whom the authorities of the United States of America issued an arrest warrant for terrorism. Upon entering the Republic of Moldova, he was accompanied by another 19-year-old citizen of the Republic of Georgia, both passengers on the "Istanbul-Chișinău" flight.

The two were detained after disembarking from the aircraft and escorted for additional checks. As a result, SIS officers together with Border Police employees, found documents confirming their training in specialized military training centres, as well as multimedia materials with terrorist content.

We note that the Security and Intelligence Service is empowered to collect, analyze and leverage information about potential risks and threats to anti-terrorist security, obtained as a result of intelligence and counterintelligence activity.

The citizen wanted by INTERPOL was documented and placed in the pre-trial detention facility of the Chișinău Police Department, while the second Georgian citizen was declared inadmissible on the territory of the Republic of Moldova and was returned to the Republic of Turkey.

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Alexandru Musteața, Director of the Security and Intelligence Service, held a press conference on the assessment of the Russian Federation's involvement in electoral processes of the Republic of Moldova in 2024-2025.

During the event, he presented information held by the institution, indicating an unprecedented level of intensity in the Russian Federation’s actions aimed at anchoring the Republic of Moldova in its sphere of influence.

The Director highlighted the objectives, actors, tools and tactics used in hybrid attacks on democratic processes, aimed to compromise the European integration vector, interfere in the presidential elections and referendum, and infiltrate political parties in the Moldovan Parliament that are under the influence of the Russian Federation.

To achieve their objectives, hostile forces rely on a strategy that includes three main elements:

- Supporting political actors under direct or indirect control of the Russian Federation;

- Creating several crises across several areas of social and political life;

- Conducting large-scale information attacks to amplify the psychological impact of these crises.

Hybrid influences from the Russian Federation are based on interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Moldova, involving political actors, associative structures/pro-Russian groups of influence, analytics companies connected to the Russian factor, and separate groups of citizens clandestinely financed by external subversive centers.

The main tools of influence remain: the alteration of content in the information space, implicitly through propaganda channels (such as Telegram and TikTok), as well as protests used to erode trust in the current government. Additionally, the creation of a regional power pole in the UTAG (Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia), loyal to the Russian factor, is being used to blackmail the country's central authorities. Another tool that external subversive centres employ is the intention to provoke a political crisis by identifying and corrupting a number of public figures, representatives of pro-European parties, which would lead to the disappointment of citizens in the current political class.

The SIS Director also reiterated the call for citizens to be vigilant, to seek information from official sources and not to be manipulated by the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation and its controlled influential actors. "I emphasize that the plans to destabilize the Republic of Moldova in 2023 have failed. The institutions, including the SIS, have thwarted attempts to undermine democratic processes. We will continue to inform the public about foreign threats to the Republic of Moldova and to combat any attempts to hinder the development of our country and the European vector," said Alexandru Musteața.

The comprehensive report on the elements outlined at the conference has been sent to the legal beneficiaries. The institution continues to analyse security risks and acts to prevent potential crises, hinder any attempts of external interference in the internal affairs of our country, and actively cooperate with national institutions to maintain constitutional order.

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The officers of the Security and Intelligence Service and of the National Anticorruption Center (CNA), under the lead of the Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office, carried out today 9 searches in a criminal case on particularly large-scale money laundering, committed by an organized criminal group.

According to the investigated facts, five persons with residency in the northern region of the country, aiming to introduce into circulation financial means of a suspicious origin via interbank systems of fast transfers (Western Union, ‎Zolotaya Korona, ‎Inteliexpress , Moneygram, Ria Money Transfer, etc.), introduced illicit financial means on the territory of the Republic of Moldova in several tranches.

Thus, from August to December 2023, more than 90 individuals were identified and recruited. For financial remuneration, they offered their personal bank details to transfer and disguise the origin of the funds offered by the organized criminal group, making withdrawals documented by the prosecution in the amount of 197,861 euros and 19,822 dollars.

As a result of the criminal investigation, financial means and several information storage devices were seized.

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The Security and Intelligence Service along with other state authorities in the field of security and public order, took notice of the false information disseminated on a social network regarding threats to schools from Chișinău.

The SIS qualifies these actions as a hybrid attack, aimed to create panic in society. We mention that the photos and materials shared online are not current and were taken from Russian social networks.

In this context, we urge the society to keep calm and maintain vigilance. We assure you that law enforcement agencies are taking all necessary measures to elucidate who is behind these actions and minimize their impact.

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Today, the Security and Intelligence Service is marking the State Security Workers’ Day and the 32nd anniversary of the Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova.

According to the institutional tradition, the official event began with the leadership of the Security and Intelligence Service and members of the SIS Board laying flowers at the monument dedicated to the heroes of state security bodies. After the tribute paid to all those who sacrificed themselves for the defense of the territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Moldova, a new class of intelligence officers took the oath of allegiance to the Motherland in front of the monument.

The event proceeded with a festive meeting, attended by Mrs. Maia SANDU, President of the Republic of Moldova and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, SIS veterans and guests of honor.

During the ceremony, Alexandru MUSTEAȚA, Director of the Security and Intelligence Service, mentioned that the institution has to become stronger both intellectually and operationally, as well as to remain an intelligence service dedicated to the defense of the citizen, society and the state. "What we are building now will define us over time as an entity that is nationally respected and accepted in the European and international intelligence communities."

He reiterated the institutional priorities that will determine the growth of performance benchmarks, the development of informational, operational and technical capabilities necessary to manage threats, regardless of their nature. He also emphasized that efforts will still be focused on defending constitutional values, preventing and countering hybrid threats, as well as cross-border organized crime. At the same time, some major changes for the intelligence community from the Republic of Moldova were reviewed, including the update of the package of national security laws, and for the first time, approval of a law on counterintelligence and external intelligence activity, which offers SIS clear responsibilities and tools, adapted to domestic and international reality, necessary to ensure the security of the state. Another success was the expansion of cooperation with European intelligence services and invitations to join a series of multilateral intelligence cooperation platforms, which represent a recognition of the Security and Intelligence Service as a credible partner and an active participant in building the regional security environment.

Moreover, Alexandru MUSTEAȚA expressed his respect for the professionalism, contribution and ethical values of the intelligence officers, as well as for the team spirit, which lead to institutional success.

In her speech, the President of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, stated that: "The Service is on the threshold of a year full of challenges, important missions, and reforms. At the same time, Russia's brutal and full-scale war against Ukraine has brought old threats back to the European continent. Climate change and new technologies bring new risks that we have not faced before. Moldova must be prepared to withstand these old and new threats. In this complicated and rapidly changing context, the informational support provided by the SIS will be crucial for us to successfully adapt and reposition ourselves in the new regional environment. We are counting on the ability of the SIS to anticipate, warn and where possible – to prevent threats before they manifest themselves".

Also today, during the festive meeting, Victor HODOROJA, colonel of the SIS, was appointed as deputy director of the Security and Intelligence Service.

Moreover, as a sign of appreciation for outstanding results achieved in the activity, several officers were awarded state and departmental awards.

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Dear citizens,

Independence Day is the time when we reaffirm our respect for national values and pride for everything that defines our country and nation. It is an opportunity to reflect on the past and especially the present and future, in which we need peace, stability and a resilient security system.

Over 32 years, the Security and Intelligence Service protects the independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova and promotes national interests. The institution is and will remain dedicated to the defense of the citizen and the state.

A safe, prosperous and appreciated Moldova can be made by the people of this country, wherever they are.

The Security and Intelligence Service is at the service of the present and future of the Republic of Moldova.

Fidelis Patriae!

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The SIS jointly with PCCOCS (Prosecutor’s Office for Counteracting Organized Crime and Special Cases) concluded and submitted to court a criminal case initiated on the constitutive elements of "Treason" (art. 337) and "Espionage" (art. 338) of the Criminal Code regarding a group of people involved in organization of hostile activities against the security of the Republic of Moldova.

In particular, starting with 2020, a group of people, consisting of Russian Federation citizens – Iurie G. and Vadim Y. – conducted activities to recruit citizens of the Republic of Moldova in the interest of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and building an agent network in the country.

The activity of the Russian citizens and the agent network was aimed at:

- Influencing the social and political processes of the Republic of Moldova, in the interest of the Russian Federation;

- Maintaining the dependence of the Republic of Moldova on the Russian Federation;

- Carrying out information operations to shape the public opinion.

For two years, during which the activity of the agent network was documented, they collected data and information of social and political nature, especially about legislative intentions and plans, compromising information about political leaders and actors, organized illegal information projects, such as online campaigns via several social media platforms, with a major focus on the Telegram network, which is the platform through which most false information is shared. Likewise, the group committed crimes under a foreign flag and recruited citizens to participate in or provoke violent acts.

In the process, the authorities documented the creation of channels for transferring money from the Russian Federation to the Republic of Moldova in order to finance subversive operations against the interests and security of the Republic of Moldova. Therefore, one of the agents recruited by Iurie G. and Vadim Y., was tasked to identify and secure such financial channels, to provide logistical support for the projects ordered and financed by the FSB, but also to recruit other citizens of the Republic of Moldova. Among the channels of illegal transfer of funds, the officers documented transfers via cryptocurrency and the so-called "HAVALA" system and involvement in the liquidity system of currency exchange offices. In total, in 2021, about 500 thousand US dollars was transferred from the Russian Federation to the Republic of Moldova, through dark channels. The money was used for carrying out the mentioned illegal activities.

The person brought to justice (under arrest) was recruited on financial considerations, starting in 2021. He was involved in identifying funding channels and participating in the planning and implementation of illegal projects in the interest of the Russian Federation.

At the current stage, the person is accused of committing the crime provided for in art. 337 "Treason", para. 1, being liable to a criminal penalty of imprisonment from 12 to 20 years. Moreover, during the criminal investigation, the authorities identified the constitutive elements of the crime provided for in art. 190 para. 6 "Fraud on a particularly large scale".

The criminal investigation continues. Currently, three people are subjected to accusation, among them - citizens of the Russian Federation, Iurie G. and Vadim Y., and a citizen of the Republic of Moldova, who is declared wanted. The SIS and the PCCOCS will inform later about the progress of the criminal investigation.

We mention that the person is presumed innocent until proved guilty by final court sentence.

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The Parliament adopted in final reading the draft law on counterintelligence and external intelligence activity.

The document provides the list of counterintelligence measures, which can be carried out by the Security and Intelligence Service. They will be authorized by a judge from the Chișinău Court of Appeal, and the appeals will be examined by a panel of three judges from the Supreme Court of Justice. At the same time, the SIS intends to introduce a more rigorous and efficient mechanism for information control and security.

We note that after the first reading, around 20 public debates were organized, where the amendments, objections and recommendations of the Venice Commission were examined, as well as the opinions of the institutions.

The draft law on counterintelligence and external intelligence activity is part of a set of legislative initiatives concerning the activity of the Security and Intelligence Service.

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This morning, the Director of the Security and Intelligence Service, Alexandru Musteața, took part in activities commemorating the heroes fallen in the Second World War.

Together with the top leadership of the country and other state officials, Alexandru Musteața laid flowers at the "Maica Îndurerată" monument and at the "Eternitate" Memorial Complex, then a minute of silence was held in memory of those who gave up their lives to bring peace back to the continent.

The sacrifice of those who fought and fell in World War II reminds us once again our duty to value life, to keep regional and global peace, and to ensure a steady and prosperous future for all generations.

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The Security and Intelligence Service strongly condemns the atrocities committed by the Soviet totalitarian regime during the existence of the Moldavian SSR.

The information regarding the flagrant violations of human rights admitted during the Soviet period on the territory of the Republic of Moldova will be available for the public and academic/scientific groups, in order to rehabilitate the people who suffered, as well as to strengthen the efforts to elucidate the historical truth.

Therefore, the Security and Intelligence Service boosted the declassification process of the files stored in the institution's special state repository and started bilateral consultations with the National Agency of Archives to transfer them.

As a result, Alexandru Musteața, Director of the Security and Intelligence Service, had a meeting with Igor Cașu, Director of the National Agency of Archives, and they signed an inter-institutional cooperation agreement.

The agreement stipulates a gradual transfer of archival documents, in particular those regarding political repressions during the Soviet period and – for the first time – the files on administrative activity of the Soviet coercive institution within the Moldavian SSR.

At this stage, the Security and Intelligence Service will transfer to the National Agency of Archives over 2,000 files stored in the special state repository of the institution.

Alexandru Musteața stated that the institution will continue its efforts in selecting and processing the documents from the archives in order to facilitate their transfer to the National Agency of Archives, so that people interested in knowing the historical past of the country can have access to them.

In his turn, Igor Cașu thanked the SIS for its openness and consistent contribution to the national documentary heritage, noting that he will continue to strengthen the mutual cooperation in this field.

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By SIS Director’s Order No.22 of April 20, the list of online content sources spreading fake information that affects national security, during the state of emergency, approved by Parliament Decision No. 41/2022, was completed with the following websites:

politnavigator.net;

politnavigator.news;

news-front.info.

The order containing mandatory indications was sent to providers of electronic communications networks and/or services, in order to immediately block, in accordance with the law, the access of users from the Republic of Moldova to the mentioned sources.

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The SIS officers jointly with the PCCOCS prosecutors and with the support of the Border Police detained five men from the Briceni district for facilitating the illegal entry of men from Ukraine into the Republic of Moldova outside the border crossing points, in exchange for 3000 USD per person.

The detained persons are aged between 30 and 60. Their leader is also their employer in an agricultural enterprise. They are part of a cross-border organized criminal group and were detained after they transported two Ukrainian men to Chișinău, who were going to transit the Republic of Moldova to the European Union and paid their illegal services with cryptocurrency - the equivalent of about 3000 US dollars for each person.

The five persons were detained on April 3, 2023. During the searches, authorities seized communication devices (mobile phones and radios). After the hearings, the individuals were charged for organizing illegal migration and authorities requested preventive arrest warrants for a period of 30 days.

Investigations continue, during which the detained members of the criminal group are presumed innocent.

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By SIS Director’s Order No.18 of March 22, the list of online content sources spreading fake information that affects national security, during the state of emergency, approved by Parliament Decision No. 41/2022, was completed with the following websites:

sputniknews.com;

md.sputniknews.com;

ro.sputniknews.com;

sputniknews.ru;

md.sputniknews.ru

The order containing mandatory indications was sent to providers of electronic communications networks and/or services, in order to immediately block, in accordance with the law, the access of users from the Republic of Moldova to the mentioned sources.

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On February 27, 2023, during counter-intelligence measures aimed at detecting risks to national security, the Security and Intelligence Service found two foreign citizens on the territory of the Republic of Moldova that are connected to certain subversive centers outside the country.

They were trained in data and information gathering activities for the implementation of a plan to destabilize the internal situation in the country and cause a violent change to the constitutional order of the Republic of Moldova. Also, the two foreign individuals, disguised as simple tourists, were coordinated by a group of people affiliated to a covert network of experts in political technologies and social engineering from abroad.

It should be noted that, during their stay on the national territory of the Republic of Moldova, the foreign citizens initiated a complex of intelligence and subversive actions to investigate various locations near government offices and critical infrastructure facilities. Moreover, they actively participated in monitoring of social and political processes in the country and the protest actions organized in the capital by certain political forces.

In order to stop the subversive activity likely to endanger the national security of the Republic of Moldova, the Security and Intelligence Service jointly with the General Inspectorate for Migration declared the foreign citizens as undesirable persons for a period of 10 years and removed them from the territory of the country, in accordance with art. 55 para. (1) from Law no. 200/2010 on regime of foreigners in the Republic of Moldova.

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Following the statements of the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the Security and Intelligence Service confirms that we received the respective information from our Ukrainian partners.

At the same time, we mention that the SIS carries out operational measures to elucidate any attempts to destabilize the situation in the country and cooperates closely with its partner intelligence services.

In this context, the SIS confirms that subversive activities, aimed to undermine the Republic of Moldova, destabilize and violate public order, were identified based on both information presented by our Ukrainian partners and operational activity of the SIS.

At the moment, we cannot provide more details as there is a risk of jeopardizing various ongoing operational activities.

We assure the citizens of the Republic of Moldova that all state institutions are working at full capacity and will not allow these challenges to happen.

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In accordance with points 26-28 of the Disposition No.1 of 24 February 2022 of the Commission for Emergency Situations of the Republic of Moldova, during the data collection process regarding online sources spreading misinformation that affects national security, the institution identified the following website: rubaltic.ru.

Subsequently, by the Order of the SIS Director No. 7, the Security and Intelligence Service requested to block the mentioned website as a source that promotes misinformation that incites hatred and war, during the state of emergency, approved by the Parliament Decision No. 41/2022.

The issued Order contains mandatory indications and was forwarded to providers of electronic communications networks and/or services, in order to immediately block, in accordance with the law, the access of users from the Republic of Moldova to the mentioned source.

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During 2022, the Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova received 923 petitions. Of the total number, 572 petitions were sent by individuals, 296 - by legal entities, 13 collective petitions and 42 anonymous. We also note that 241 petitions arrived via official email of the institution, and 682 petitions were received in the SIS antechamber via SOE "Poşta Moldovei".

Some of the most frequent topics raised by petitioners include:

- threats to state security, in the context of the war in Ukraine (human trafficking, counter-espionage, illegal crossing of the state border, smuggling, etc.);

- requests to block profiles on social networks/websites/media portals that incite hatred and war;

- information regarding attempts to destabilize the constitutional order (organization of mass protests that incite violence and interethnic hatred);

- fake bomb alerts at the premises of the courts and Chișinău International Airport;

- complaints regarding the energy crisis in the Republic of Moldova;

- alleged illegal actions of employees of the prosecution/judiciary system (prosecutors, judges, bailiffs) manifested by exceeding their duties and abuse of power;

- requests for information regarding the grounds for accessing personal data and carrying out the special investigative measure - interception of telephone conversations;

- requests for information from legal entities and private individuals regarding the grounds that national authorities had for including them in the sanction lists (provided for in point 1.2 of the Decision No. 45 of October 31, 2022 of the Commission for Emergency Situations).

- alleged irregularities within the National Army and the National Administration of Penitentiaries of the Republic of Moldova;

- attempts to embezzle state property and conflicts of interest from some officials and former management of SE "Railway of Moldova";

- issuing the permission to carry out flights with remotely piloted devices (drones);

- requests for information/copies of the files of political repressions victims.

We mention that the petitions received by the SIS were resolved within the terms established by the law, in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Code of the Republic of Moldova. Also, 70 petitions from the total number were redirected to the competent public authorities.

In 2022, the leadership of the Security and Intelligence Service had audiences with 17 persons.

The Security and Intelligence Service consistently applies the provisions on transparency and access to public information in its activity within the limits provided by national legislation.

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An order providing for the blocking of two online sources, which promote information that incites hatred and war under the state of emergency, was issued today, January 19, by the Director of the Security and Intelligence Service. Therefore, the websites eadaily.com and bloknot.ru will be shut down.

The order containing mandatory indications was sent to the National Registrar of top-level domain “.md” names and providers of electronic communications networks and/or services, in order to immediately block, in accordance with the law, the access of users from the Republic of Moldova to the mentioned sources.

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"Ensuring national security and protecting human rights in a democratic society" was the topic of a round table, organized by the National Institute of Intelligence and Security "Bogdan, Întemeietorul Moldovei" on December 9.

The event was carried out in partnership with the People's Advocate Office and the Center for Security Studies and Crisis Management.

The meeting provided a discussion platform for security and human rights researchers and experts, who debated several issues related to these fields. Also, the participants discussed topics regarding the protection of human rights in terms of national security and proposed effective measures to regulate them.

Moreover, the scientific forum contributed to establishment of new relationships that will promote the security culture in society and will boost the exchange of experience and best practices regarding the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

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The SIS officers, together with PCCOCS prosecutors, officers of the Customs Service and internal security of the Border Police, on Sunday, uncovered an attempt to smuggle 17,900 packs of cigarettes out of the country, through the "Costești-Stânca" border crossing point.

They were found in flagrante delicto in a means of transport, which had a double floor to hide the tobacco. As a result, the cigarettes and the means of transport were seized for confiscation, while the driver and the scheme organizer, aged 37 and 44, were detained.

Investigations continue, also concerning public officials who allegedly facilitated the smuggling attempt. At this stage, they are presumed innocent.

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The Security and Intelligence Service informs the public about several normative acts, registered in the Parliament, which aim to improve the existing legal provisions and adjust them to the standards of special services from the countries with consolidated democracy. In particular, it refers to: Law on the Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova; Law on intelligence and counterintelligence activity; Law amending the Law no. 170/2007 on the status of the intelligence and security officer.

The draft laws have been placed on the Parliament’s official website for public consultation and debate. They were also submitted to the Venice Commission for examination and legal opinion.

The main reasons that determined the institution to review the legislation in this field are: the radical change in the security environment both at the national and regional level, the outdated normative framework that no longer responds to the unprecedented threats to the country, and the need of the SIS modernization.

The proposed amendments provide for the detailing of the SIS duties for a better delimitation of the activities that belong to the competence of the institution from those of other state bodies. Also, the amendments help the institution to become more efficient and accomplish its missions in optimal conditions.

It should be noted that the draft law on intelligence and counterintelligence activity is an innovative one and aims to adjust the SIS to the dynamics of risks and threats to national security.

Currently, there is no separate legal act that regulates intelligence and counterintelligence activity, which would be focused on risk prevention.

Moreover, additional mechanisms to control the SIS activity will be created and will provide complementary guarantees that fundamental rights and freedoms are respected during the intelligence and counterintelligence activity. One of them is the obligation to inform the person subjected previously to counterintelligence measures.

The normative act provides for the establishment of the judicial mandate, which is a court authorization allowing to carry out counterintelligence measures. Thus, the judicial control over the SIS activity will be ensured.

The draft laws are aimed at adjusting the legislation in the field to the European Community acquis and offering new tools to reduce the probability of materializing risks to national security. Moreover, they will strengthen and intensify the control of the state and society over the SIS activity and will exclude the possibilities of abuse.

The Security and Intelligence Service invites the society to analyze the draft laws mentioned above. Any proposals to improve the legal acts can be sent, by December 12, both to the SIS and the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, at the following emails: sis@sis.md and csn@parlament.md

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