Security and Intelligence Service

of the Republic of Moldova

External interference in electoral processes in the Republic of Moldova

Today, during the plenary session of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, the SIS Director, Alexandru Musteața presented the institutional report on the electoral frauds identified by the Security and Intelligence Service during the presidential elections and constitutional republican referendum held this year.

 

The report contains detailed and complex information on the forms of external interference in the electoral process in the Republic of Moldova, including illicit financing, propaganda campaigns, disinformation, etc.

 

According to data obtained by the Service, an operational command center was set up in Moscow (Russian Federation), under the coordination of the Russian authorities, with the primary objective of compromising the republican referendum and the presidential elections. For this purpose, the Russian factor appointed Ilan Shor as the leader of this criminal group, providing him with all the necessary tools: financial, media, human, logistical, technical resources, as well as counterintelligence support.

 

The SIS jointly with the national authorities and foreign partners reacted promptly to prevent and combat external interference and other prominent risks regarding the electoral process, carrying out multiple and diverse measures within their competence. As a result, the institutions identified and countered the activity of pseudo-observers involved in election monitoring, prevented and thwarted cyber attacks on electoral infrastructure, prevented subversive actions aimed to disturb the public order, recorded cases of vote buying and foiled plans that were intended to compromise the activities of polling stations abroad (the scenario of fake bomb alerts).

 

At the same time, the Service informed about the security risks posed by the clear trend of the Russian factor to use informational influence tools. They were actively employed by the Russian Federation for propaganda and disinformation. As an example, in 2024, the institution identified a network that systematically shared pro-Kremlin narratives (including pro-war) via Telegram, TikTok and YouTube.

 

The full and detailed report describing and demonstrating the whole spectrum of external interference in the electoral process that took place this year in the Republic of Moldova can be found here.